What Seems To Be the Problem? Teachers come to their education equipped with many set ideas. These ideas are often implicit and refer to teaching, learning, school, children, and the subjects to be taught. Emotionally charged, these ideas tend to fit with the imperfect social and institutional order into which future teachers are born and in which they participate. The observa dons of the 19th-century philosopher Josiah Royce (1908 Royce ( /1969 about how people learn what they want to do with their lives are especially true for teaching:
One gets one's various plans of life suggested through the models that are set before each one of us by his fellows. Plans of life first come to us in connection with our endless imitative activities. These imitative processes begin in our infancy, and run on through our whole life. . . . Social activities are the ones that first tend to organize all of our instincts, to give unity to our passions and impulses, to transform our natural chaos of desires into some sort of orderusually, indeed, a very imperfect order. (p. 867) Whatever we do as re5.earchers and reformers in education, we cannot ignore this stubborn fact. It is troublesome, because frequently the ideas that future teachers bring to their preparation are not the sort that we would want them to entertain.
The ideas of future teachers have thLir roots and warrants in common sense and life expericncea powerful combination of the "plain" with the "vivid" that is hard to combat.
Years spent in classrooms, watching teachers and being pupils, contribute to the assumptions of future teachers and shape their understandings of teaching and learning, of children and subject areas, in terms of concrete images and habituai interpretations. How can one educate people about what they are already famIar with? Structures which uphold their world seem necessary and inconsequential to people incapable of grasping them.
The Questions
The difficult question for teacher education research and curriculum is just what can and should be substituted for what is conventionally seen as true and right in schools.
I-An ..arlier version of this paper appeared in 1989 under the title "Breaking From Expeneme in Teatner EduL.atiun. When Is It Necessary? How Is It Possible?" in the Oxford Review of Education, 15, [181] [182] [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] [190] [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] 2Margret Buchn ann, a professor of teacher edut..atiun at Maigan State University, ts a senior researther with the Institute for Research on Teaching.
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Followers of Dewey would advise using the experiences of teacher candidates as foundations for bridges to new ways of thinking and acting. (This is easier said than done, as even the faithful will admit.) Yet selolars and teacher educators have begun to question Dewey's "continuity principle," or the notion that desirable leaining always evolves in an unbroken chain Jut of pastpreferably concrete, everydayexperience (Floden, Buchmann, and Schwille, 1987) . Some explore the idea that the preparation of teachers must go against the grain of ordinary experience, that it must induce "breaks" with what can be learned in the school of life (see, e.g., Ball, 1989; Florio-Ruane and Lensmire, 1990; McDiarmid, 1490) . Does learning to teach necessitate instructive interruptions of what future teachers consider the natural order of teaching anU learning in schools? How can one justify the approach cf breaking with future teachers' experiences? I will work through these questions by examining two arguments supporting the case for breaks with experience: the "conversion" argument, based on comparisons of teaching to other professions, and the "dead-hand-of-the-past" argument. The fundamental justification for this approach to professional education lies in the hope that reversals of belief will enable future teachers to make critical ideals of knowledge and justice felt in their work. As William James (1891/1969) explains: All the higher, more penetrating ideals are revolutionary. They present themselves far less in the guise of effects of past experience than in that of probable causes of future experience, factors to which the environment and the lessons it has so far taught us must learn to bend. (p. 172; italics added)
The call for "breaks" is, in essence, a variant of the familiar plea for radical change, on the assumption that the gains will be worth the costs.
Questioning the Questions
What do we mean, and what do we mean to do, when we speak of "breaking from experience in teacher education?" A brief digression should be helpful. Experiences are the stuff of life and thought. People have and undergo experiences all the time: in riding a bicycle, having a fight, dreaming, or reading a paper. Breaks are extraordinary events that interrupt the flow of hours, thoughts, and activities. They can be pleasant or unpleasant, salutary or not, depending on what is being interrupted and what does supplant it.
Breaking with or from something suggests a turning to something else. Victorian women left tho?.ir homes to nurse soldiers on some battle field or to explore the Himalayas.
A child raised among the proverbial idle rich or laboring poor might turn to art as a vocation, and so on. As implied in these examples, what people break with seems less desirable than what they turn to, usually in the face of opposition and upheavals. The reason for making a break of this sort lies in the different and superior states or 2 7 characteristics supposed to ensue. Thus, "breaking from or with something" is associated with worthwhile change: the getting of wisdom, an independent spirit, or the advancement of a better social order.
Whatever people are turning to, however, in breaking with prior experience, they cannot escape experience. Rather, they move from one iealm of experience, conceptually and practically organized, to another realm with a different organization. People usually think of this movement as learning; part of it stems from seeing the past differently, in the light of other ideas. Hence, experience is often not so much overcome as transformed, and what happens to people, though consequential, may be less important than what they end up doing with it, through secondary, "brain-born" learnings.
Do breaks from experience allow people some return to what was previously experienced as natural? Can valuable aspects of a pattern he protected while others are being replaced" These are questions of some moment, for not everything left behind will be bad in all aspects, whether it is innocence, stability, or life at home. In putting a new order in place, one must consider not only the goods one is confident of producing but also possibilities of loss and harm.
Peopleand I have to include myself here (see Floden, Buchmann, and Schwille, 1987) thus do not literally mean what they say when they speak of breaking from (or with) experience. The phrase calls up a number of assumptions concerning more or less desirable conceptual ant. :nactical organizations of systematically diffei ent kinds of experiences in teaching and teacher learning. These assumptions bear on teachers, schools, pupils, teaching subjects, even on the concepts of knowing and learning, and are divided along the lines of the given and some deeper, often rosier, view. In shorthand fashion, the notion of "breaks" conveys the message that drastic measures are needed to cross the borderline.
Introducing the Supporting Arguments
The first argument in support of breaks from experience in teacher education is of a general nature. It could Le called the "dead-hand-of-the-past" argument. In brief, one can argue that teacher education requires forcible instructive interruptions of what students take for granted becanse of the adaptive power that life experiences have. One of the effects of undergoing many everyday experiences is that they attach one to the given, wnatever it may be (see, e.g., Buchmann and Schwille, 1983) .
The "conversion" argument and its applications in teaching. The second argument is more specific and derives from looking at other pro:essions. Becoming a nurse, doctor, or lawyer tends to be marked by deeply felt transformations. Learners in these professions experience their socialization as a revolutionary change of world views: a separationalmost alienationfrom naive Of lay perceptions, involving reversals of belief on the road to expertise and professional membership. In teacher education, the comparative or "conversion" argument has special bearing for several areas of belief. First, understandings of teaching and its subjects can be derived either from the disciplines of knowledge or from common sense ticl people's experience of schooling. When we speak of "professionals," however, we usually take the side of special knowledge, of "expertise" that is, by definition, discontiruous with common sense or life experience.
A second application of the conversion argument stems from teachers' responsibility for the learning of many children from whom they may be divided by gender, culture, class, or race. IF teachers are to build "bridges of reasonableness" (Soltis, 1981) between children and teaching subjects and among youngsters who differ from one another, teachers must not only know their subjects flexibly and deeply. They must likewise break with many personally compelling ideas about how people act, talk, or feel, and develop perceptions of others that are just and kind (Buchmann, 1988) .
The relations of teaching to common sense and life experience are, however, complicated. Teaching and learning are universal human enterprises, neither the sole domain of experts nor limited to the institution of schooling. And the effects of experience on future teachers' thoughts and actions, though certainly not all good, will hardly be all bad. Turning to the first argument in support of breaks from experience in teacher preparation, we might ask the following question: Fond of it or not, we are all amateurs of school knowledge. With 10,000 hours of schooling in many countries, pupils learn more than the curriculum. They get acquainted with the ways of teachers and the workings of the place called school. Children are at the receiving Lnd of the teaching typical for many schools and teachers. In participants, these "folkways of teaching" (Buchmann, 1987) induce a felt fitness between things. As patterns of thought and action, folkways do not lend themselves well to questioning, especially by insiders. But "teaching as usual" does meet some of the functional needs of schooling.
Perhaps a boy or girl of 12 years will not be able to say this clearly, but what usually happens in schools allows for some content coverage, some participation, and some classroom control by structuring who gets to say or do something, when, and, by and large, what. And in the catalogue of known means to erds in teaching, which people absorb through schooling, we have the makings-of a modest sciencea science that is imperfect, pat dal in outlook, and technical in orientation (see Schwab, 1978b) . The drawback of this catalogue is that it takes means as permanent and rather ordinary ends for granted.
Why Fo.kways of Teaching Are Well Entrenched
The power of children's experiential learningsmany would say, mislearnings (;,ee, e.g., Zeichler, 1980 Zeichler, , 1981 Feirnan-Nemser and Buchmann, 1985) derives from be h their content and their modes and contexts of acquisition. As regards content, the school knowledge students acquire fits with the views of common sense that fix attention on what seems palpably obvious. To be sure, people need to know, for instance, their number facts.
But one can teach them as one has been taught; that is, mostly by tellingif necessary, repeated tellingwhich, together with practice is supposed to make facts "sink into the mind." From a commonsense point of view, the concept of number is not in question; just like lectures and schools, numbers are part of our world. These things are known, not to be knownand thus they are perpetuated.
Subject to "teaching as usual" as institutional inmates, many pupils leam something some of the time and become familiar, by acquaintance and participation, with the folkways of (schooi) teaching themselves. Their learning is reinforced twice by everience: by the experience of success (if a partial, intermittent, and unevenly distributed kind of successwhich is just what common sense would lead one to expect) and by the experience of partkipation, or the act and condition of taking part in school (not occasionally, but in a regular way, starting at an impressionable age).
Twice reinforced by experience, overshadowed by years of institutional captivity, and shot through with imaginative identifications, the "folkways of teaching" are well entre.ached.
Participation, again, has two sides. It leads to automatic readings of situationinducing habitual meanings and actionsand is itself a powerful test. In schooling, doing things alone or in concert with others shows what vdorks and doesn't work, given limited, utilitarian ends, such as "getting done" or "getting it right." These ends are rarely examined because of being obliquely affirmed in institutional structures and patterns of classroom life, supported, for the most part, by common sense.
Fo; teacilers, who have to act, it stands to reason that they have to find quickly what works in the range of situations they are most likely to encounter, and learn to perform that work, together with children, reliably and well. Among other things, they have to acquire techniques and habits of equable command, blending the "hard" with the "soft" sides of teaching, such as empathy and patience (Lortie, 1975) . Having a repertoire of concrete, vivid images of people with the requisite presence is a great help in that, as is working in ways that fit with the expectations of school children. The placid certainty of common sense inspires new teachers with a confidence they need and that will reassure pupils besides. Are these leatnings all mislearnings? The answer is ambiguous. The Equivocal Benefits of Schooling for Learning to Teach For one thing, it would be good to remember that people always undervalue what they have never been without. Teacher educators are no exception. I wonder what nursing educators, for example, would say if their students knew as much about hospitals as future teachers know about schools. Many nurses come to their preparation believing that they will dispense loving-kindness to the helpless (Davis, 1968) . They have not had endless hours of exposuie to nurses, seeing them, in the words of one nurse, "calm, balanced, efficient, moving up and down the wards self-protected by . . . bright immunity from pity.. . . merging [their] own individuality in the impersonal routine of the organisation" (Brittain, 1980, p. 211) . Could an aspiring public defense lawyer picture a day between chambers and courts, or imagine the wiles of judges and witnesses? Teacher educators, by contrast, can at least rely on their students' knowing schools as inmates: by participation, acquaintance, and imaginative identification, that is, with the strengths and defects of these ways of knowing.
The two faces of common sense. For another thing, acting and thinking within the system of common sense is not the same as being dead to reason. in their lighter moments, professional thinkers agree with the commonsense tenet that it is a good thing to keep things plain. Common sense has an outlook and style with appeal while avoiding some of the pitfalls of self-conscious thought. As Freud reputedly said, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.
The presumption of self-evidence inherent to common sense, however, chokes off discussion and challenge. Given social change, human fallibility, and our limited knowledge, these are high costs. Furthermore, stylistic predilections for tht. mundanl. bias people and limit their vision. As William James (1891/1969) explains: "The moment you get beyond the coarser and more commonplace moral maxims, the Decalogues and Poor Richard's Almanacs, you fall into schemes and positions which to thc eye of common-sense are fantastic and overstrained" (p. 171). To the extent that leading a good iife (as a teacher, nurse, citizen, etc.) requires loyalty to causes and higher ideaV (such as charity, truth, justice) entwined with loyalty to other peLple, these limits spell trouble. Josiah Royce (1908 Royce ( /1969 , greatly admired by James, makes clear why that is so: Loyalty.. . . is an idealizing of human life, a communion with invisible aspects of our social exist mce. Too great literalness in the interpretation of human relations is, therefore, a foe to the development of loyalty. If my neighbor is to me merely a creature of a day, who walks and eats and talks and buys and sells, I shall never learn to be loyal to his cause and to mine. (p. 958)
Obfuscations of natural understandings. What throws another wrench into my halfhearted case for schooling as part of teacher education is that typical school practices and their assumptions do not always live up to common sense. Most of us realize that children 6 1 1 are quite taken with the extraordinary, far removed from the banalities of basal readers or the insipid facts about "postal carriers" and "my town" presumably introducing children to their world in social studies. Surne of the vapidity of school learning caii be chalked up to a tradition of research on word frequencies and a confusion of the frequency with the importance of words in composing Lexts and learning to read. (Thornd'ke warned against this fallacy early on; see Clifford, 1978.) An obfuscation of natural understandings can, .:ierefore, sometimes be traced to research and its mistaken authority in education, that is, the false belief that finding out things about the world can tell people what they ought to do. The example of sociat studies highlight:, another source. As Brophy (1990) argues, the stability of the concentric pattern of "teaching as usual" :n social studiesfamily, neighborhood, hometown, state, and su oncan be explained by the capacity uf that pattern to adapt to all kinds of educational fads and eArernal pulicies with which teachers must cope. This shows how functional adaptivity may override ordinary good sense in institutions.
To sum up my thoughts so far: Practitioners and researchers in education assume rightly that things could be better than they are in schools. Indeed, this is just the soothingly obvious thing a person of common sense might say. What does not follow is that the "folkways of teaching" arc untested, that they are easily uprooted, or that they are readily replaceable by sometning else that will serve most of the needs that must be met in the situation. Nevertheless, "teaching as u:Aral" is lackingit can be lacking where it Ls common sense and where it fails the test of plain thinking.
The Two-Fold Authority of the Given Regardless of their merits in the abstract, however, new understandings offered to teachers have to match the authority of the lessons absorbed in experience. "Authority" means here impressiveness as well as practicality, or objective chances at success (allowing teachers to get some content across to some people some of the time, while keeping the class in order and coping with conflicting external pressures). If reform ideologies prov ide no means for subsistence, they will have no power as prescriptions and most people will stick or revert to the "folkways of teaching" ithout being subject to blame. Replacements ior the given must somehow pick up the pieces of whatever else tumbles down, and workable supplements must be structurally fitting.
The level of ideals brings particular difficulties for reform in teacher education, fur we have to make strange, pale abstractions speak Lo future teachers, so that they can recognize their moral as well as intellectual force and respond, wholeheartedly, to the claims on their powers of imagination and action. William James (1891/1969) drives thms point home: 'The only force of appeal to us, w hich . . . an abstract ideal order can wield, is found in the 'everlasting ruby vaults' of our o. n human bearts, as they happen to beat responsive 7 1 2
and not irrespor ,ve tc the claim" (p. 178). Without responsive vibrations of students' imagination, "stubborn facts" tend to assert themselves.
Overhauling concepts of learning and knowing. There is a further big stumbling block in the path of reform. What many researchers and educators are trying to substitute for the lessons of experience in learning to teach centrally features a mode of learning and knowing that most teachers are not familiar with, and which they cannot grasp by their habitual modes of learning. If knowledge is seen as constructed and learning assimilated to inquiry, concepts of knowing and learning implicit in "teaching as usuar themselves are at issue. Teacher education reform must, therefore, include a hard WA at the epistemology of schooling, including higher education.
In all of this, we need to take seriously the fact that sigaificant learning tends to be laborious and slow. Continuing to draw on insights from the 19th century, it is worth recalling Cardinal Newman's (1852/1925) eloquent words:
We know, i,ot by a direct and simple vision, not at a glance, but, as it were, by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental process, by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions, by the employment, concentration, and joint action of many faculties and exercises of mind. (p. 151) And learning in this sense does not come merely by working hard, reading many books, witnessing masterful teaching, or attending philosophy lectures; a future teacher can do alt these things, and still "he may not realize what his mouth utters; he may not see with his mental eye what confronts him" (p. 1521
Weighing the case for "olk....te.:,* against the case for "breaks: Given these considerations, one cannot be surpris,..d that many reforms in schools and teacher education turn sour or do not even float. At worst, they muddle what is sound in common sense and practice with fads and quasi-scientific dogma. My qualified defense of common sense, and grudging case for the "folkways of teaching," throws doubts on the notion that learning to teach must include breaks with experience, and that all such breaks will be salutary. Yet the characteristic kinds of learning (both in content and modes and contexts of acquisition) associated with schooling and common sense also provide a justification fo, die forcible instructive interruption of given beliefs.
When we heavily weigh the drawbacks cf schooling as teacher preparation, the question becomes how to make such breaks effectively, turning them to good account in teachers' learning. People are usually not ready to abandon the "natural attitude," which takes a given world for granted, "without having experienced a specific shock which compels us to break through the limits of this 'finite' province of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one" (Schutz, 1962, p. 231 People entering medical school do not feel very knowing. Instead, they are cons eniently filled with a sense of their own ignorance. The preprofessional learning of these students does not ordinarily include an induction into the common varieties of doctors' "bedside manners" and ways of interacting with patients in the office. Aspiring doctors have to learn that, contrary to lay assumptions, the causes of illness are hard to pin down, a muddle of physical, environmental, and social-emotiunal factors, eddying inward and outward (Fox, 1957) .
For mirses in training, patient care turns out strangely unlike homt-grown varieties of tending the sick. "Nursing" takes on a cerebral meaninb that emphasizes detached thinking about health problems over tender-minded "doing": 'The student is enjoined to view her own person as a purposeful instrument in the therapeutic process, not merely as some benignly disposed vehicic through whom pre-formulated nursing procedures and *echniques are dispensed" (Davis, 1968, p. 241) . Law students are taught "to think like lawyers," in specialized modes of stringent reasoning and case analysis (see Bodenheimer, 1962; White, 1985) . They get used to the counterintuitive fact that, in law, it is the better case and not the better cause that wins.
Socialization in these professions removes some certainties of common sense, while instituting forms of assurance with new and different warrants. Passing through the professional mirror, doctors, nurses, and lawyers learn to see the world from behind it. For better, for worse, their education turns out professionals who differ from people on the street by what they know and care aoout. I say "for worse," because sometimes we have reason to mind the distance of professionals from shared human concerns, and wish to soften or reverse the effects of their socialization.
Converting Teachers
The comparative argument derives strength from the fact that what many researchers and educators want for teachers parallels the conversions of other professionals. Shrinking from novices' eager affirmations of "liking kids" as a reason for going into teaching, they aim to substitute motivations which have to do with orthwhile learning and social justice. They are dissatisfied with teachers' plain views of teaching as doing and telling, and their desire for procedures and techniques to follow, aiming to replace these views and desires by elaborated understandings of teaching and learning as thinking, with a focus on "why" rather than on "how." 9 1 4 Transformative ideas. Educators want tea0io to care about the human good of learningas opposed to getting things done or getting things right in schooland about the equal distribntion of that good, productive of many other goods, moral and social. They want to change what Johnny learns in school and make sure that Antonio and Maria also get to wonder about the concept of fraction and the wisdom of social arrangements. These reversals imply a shift from observables, from habits, personal experiences, and cultural patterns, to inward activities and abstract notions that may well appear strained to the eye of common sense. According to these transformative ideas, teachers stand for intellectual and civic virtues, and they are supposed to nurture these virtues in all children.
Neither common experiences in everyday life and school nor ordinary ways of making sense and of lookirg at other people are a great help in preparing teachers for the pursuit of ideals of knowledge and justice in schools. Common sense tends to turn human differences into assertions of inferiority, and it solidifies this tendency in stereotypes. Hence, teachers have to recognize many habitual ways of looking at other people for 1 ..: distorting and hurtful habits of mind that they are, and strive to oveicome those habits in perceptions and actions related specifically to their work (e.g., deliberate patterns of teacher attention and student discipline oriented toward equity; nonautomatic assumptions about which children will be interested in, or good at, what sorts of subjects, topics, or forms of work;
conception and construction of a classroom community that embodies respect for the differences among people and encourages learning from them). Many disciplinary understandings revealing the uncertainties of knowledge never make it into undergraduate education, let alone the public schools. Even understandings included in the curriculum often conflict with common sense and everyday experience. Consider science, for instance, in which "the image of a stationary earth is replaced by that of a stationary sun, iron dissolves into arrangements of electrons and protons, water is revealed to be a combination of gases and the concept of unduiations in the air of various dimensions takes the place of the images of sounds" (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 213) .
Rejtcting received understandings? The shifts desired by many researchers and teacher educators are at least as dramatic as the separations, almost alienations, from the "real world" that other professionals undergo. They are argued on similar grounds. holding up an image of what is true and right in teacher thought and action against beliefs that have deep roots. Lortie (1975) seems to agree with the impersonal stance of nursing educators when he states that "the self of the teacher, his very rrsonality . . . must be used and disciplined as a tool necessary for achieving results" (p. 156). Scholarly work on the preparation of teachers for uncertainty echoes the concerns of medical educators (Floden and Clark, 1988) .
One could argue that, just because future teachers have already been into schooling (and are constantly having many extramural experiences of teaching and learning 10 1 5 besides), their socializ,,tion must be even more of a turning point. Are ever-more complete conversions, more decided breaks with experience, required :or teachers? This seems to go too far, especially when one considers that the co.ivertedpeople who, disbanding their old ways, have been brought aver to a ncw faithare not always the be'.,t learners, becoming, instead, closed minded in a new way.
Coumerpoints Redressing the Balance Before it starts spiraling out of control, the "conversion" argument in professiorlal education in general, and in teacher education in particular, needs to be tamed. It is o, partially true for learning in all professions. This is so because a separation from ordinary human beliefs and concerns can be carried too far and may become self-serving, or mute the founding impulse of benevolence that the helping professions share. As I will argue, the "conversion" argument has, in principle, limited applicability to teaching, which also poses monumental problems of implementation.
To return to where we started: Teachers' minds are no tabula rasa, no blank slates, but scratched in deeply with plain characters. Can we replace the slates, wipe out what is upon them, or reverse interpretations, as the idea of breaks with experrer ':e in teacher education suggests? Can we do this for all teaching subjects, all concepts, topics, and methods within them? What about understandings of children and learning? Conceptions of knowledge, the teaching role, classroom life, and so on?
The weight of experience alone, downward bearing in quality and quantity, makes effective breaks on all these counts seem unlikely. Yet this weight cannot solely be seen as a dead weight which people must shake off in order to fkurish. The experiences of future teachers are no reliable sample of the real or the ideal world of teaching. Still, they include much that, deserving a skeptical respect, tends to be overlooked by the clever, by academics enamored of their fields or reformers carried away by appealing but :nsufficiently tested ideas.
Common Sense and Experience as Starting Points
Teachers may be intellectlIal leaders, but they are social managers as well, shepherding groups of youngsters down some meandering path with some purpose and kindness. Do they plan lessons? Do they reprimand and praise where appropriate and fair? Do teachers work at getting students to finish their assignments and themselves try to correct them on time? More subtly, do they put attention seekers in the:r place while encouraging the timid? Of course, teachers do these and other thino that future teachers can see or figure out in a fashion, as they go through school.
Are everyday understandings of knowledge as facts and names completely wrongheaded? Granted that science dissolves the objects of ordinary experience, we can still 11 sit upon chairs. Also, the commonsense assumption, entrenched in schools, that facts and names are essential for knowledge does resonate with the empirical and conceptual pursuits of science, though falling short of their specific elaborations, especially in terms of methods and criteria of knowing. And even Einstein probably rejoiced at getting things right and getting them done, on occasion.
This suggests th?t common sense and experience are, at least, among the starting points of teacher prenaration: sometimes to be abandoned on examination, sometimes to be refined or deepened, and sometimes to be revived after art erroneous abandonment. Of course, this puts common sense and life experience, as systems of thought anti action, on a oar with seentific theories, we have learned to understand their development in this century. A prer -ration for teaching and knowing through schooling and common sense is partial and far irom perfect, and very likely mistaken in many aspects. But it provides some lessons, and it is therein all its inescapable weight.
In examining the case for conversion in teacher education it seems, in sum, impossible to come down on one side or the other. On the one hand, the weight of taken-for-granted understandings in learning to teach makes decisive "breaks" seem necessary, while impossible on all counts. On the other hand, not on all counts are the lessons of experience (inside and outside of school) hvalid or useless as a preparation for teaching. This inconclusive assessment throws doubt, in particular, on the argument in support of breaks from experience in teacher education that derives from comparisons with other professions.
Is There Expertise in Tevhingand Does It Matter?
If we order human pursuits cn a continuum that marks their permeability to common sense and life experience (that is, their openness to nonspecialized and extraprofessional knowledge), teaching can he placed at the high end, radiology at the low, and the health professions and law somewhere in between. Degrees of relative permeability to common sense and life experience, in short, vary by profession and are not, in themselves, either good or bad. Instead, they must be judged by reference to a profession's particular responsibilities and to its current knowledge situation.
Irrational evaluations of knowledge by source. For professional activities that are, as it were, close to home, their permeability to common sense and life everience is simply a fact about an occupation involving those activities. This fact in itself allows no conclusions about the difficulty of an activity or the validity of associated knowledge.
When nonspecialized and extraprofessional knowledge are discredited, there is a confusion of the source witl the value of knowledgeits significance, complexity, coherence, and trustworthiness Just because the administration of justice has passed from clans or tribal councils to courts of law longer than health care has passed from the home to doctors' offices and hospitals, it does not follow that current legal knowledge is more sophisticated 12 I 7 or important than knowledge about human health. Conversely, where a profession is relatively impervious to extraordinary knowledge (science or specialized, technical knowledge), this allows no conclusions about the value of its working knowledge or the worth of its work.
Since received understandings and patterns of action supported by common sense include not only superstitions but also some well-winnowed, hard-earned results of collectie learning, this confusion of the source with the value of knowledge is liable to result in ignoring practical wisdom and placing too much reliance on science (Buchmann, 1985) . in any case, this confusion has an authoritarian bias:
The question about our sources of knowledge . . . has always been asked in the spirit of: "What are the best sources of our knowledgethe most reliable ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, as the last court of appeal?" . . . no such ideal sources existno more than ideal rulersand . . . all "sources" are liable to lead us into error at times. (Popper, 1962, pp. 54-55) Making the distinction betweer. the value and the source of knowledge is absolutely critical for teaching sinceunless future teacher, are kept out of schools and out of touch with people teaching knowledge will always be saturated with common sense and life experience. My claims here are consistent with recent empirical work on the nature of expertise in teaching (see Carter, Sabers, Cushing, Pinnegar, and Berliner, 1987 ; also Berliner, 1986 ).
The fit of teaching "expertise" with common sense. In selecting and interpreting 'information about students, explaining their judgments, and making instructional plans, a small sample of teachers held to be expert in their work used frames of reference and made arguments accessible to almost any person (Carter et al., 1987) . These intensively studied teachers had beliefs about what seemed worth knowing in looking at imaginary teaching tasks or situations, and they saw more cik-eply than others. But what distinguished these "experts" fits comfortably with ordinary goo, sense.
"Expert" teachers felt it important to take charge of a new classroom, laying dokn the laws for behavior and learning, and to find out "where kids are." Apparently, experience and plain thinking had made them wise to these things as well as to the "groupness" of teaching and the limits of test scores and of (other) teachers' judgments as indicators of what children know. While wasting no time on information they considered irrelevant, they made mure of the facts at hand than either novices or postulants to teaching (i.e., individuals entering the profession without pedagogical training).
As stands to reason, novices and postulants were less sure of themselves and about what to expect in teaching. They had more difficulty in seizing on meaningful information 13 is and relating it to action, seeming more "glued" to the surface of things. Experienced teaching professionals considered expert by others, however, were not set apart from aspiring teachers or people on the street by any vital change of world view or specialized interpretive and moral codes. Perhaps "expert" teachers do, albeit in a more high-powered way and with more contextual knowledge, what people do for each other as they live and work.
Empirical work has also shown that relative imperviousness to knowledge outside of the scope of experience and common sense is consistent with high-powered knowledge and skills in teaching (see Leinhardt, 1988 educated spinsters in the role of childrens' guardian, in loco parentis, with a derivative, attenuated authorityhalf-revered, hal-despised. Looking more deeply into human memory, there is the myth of the "tutelary spirit," watching over and guiding a person through life. We may find the myth quaint and the archetype demeaning. The point is they exist, highlighting the nature of teaching as a universal human concern with cultural variants and spiritual overtones. People teach, think, sing, and run because they are human:
By birthright we are all not only thinkers but also singers and dancers, poets and painters, teachers and story-tellers. This means that the professional singer or painter, poet or teacher, dancer or story-teller, is a professional in a different way from the solicitor or doctor, physicist or statistician. . . . Like the runner or the writer or the ruler the thinker may become a professional but can never become an expert. (Bambrough, 1986, p. 60) Breaks with experience in teacher education, like any educational idea or practice, must be judged by the extent to which such breaks can help people come into their own in thinking, learning, and knowing, thus escaping the blind alleys of circumstance. This applies to teachers and to their students. Words of wari:ng from a presidential address by Donald Campbell (1975) tG his fellow psychologists may deserve a hearing among educationai researchers and teacher educators: "With our conceptual framework still heavily shared with popular culture, our narcissistic motivation for creative innovation overlaps into the motivation to advocate shocking new perspectives" (p. 1121).
Whatever we do as resear,:hers and practitioners, we should not promote irrelevant notions of professional expertise in teaching. Where special knowledge is promoted with a view to raising the status of the teaching profession (see, e.g., Peters, 1977) , we should remember the sad commonpl_ ' of history that greater power does not increase peoples cr,mpetence and wisdom. When, paradoxically, concerns for teachers' standing in society lead to imperative introductions of "outside" knowledge and to a crowding out of situateu knowledge that is valid, the result is loss and harm.
No Ideal Sources of Knowledge
Let me suggest, in conclusion, that people attracted by the call for breaks with experience in teacher preparation may well share some of the motivations of artists and scientists. In the words of Einstein, One of the strongest motives that lead men to attempt science is to escape from everyday life with its painful crudity and hopeless dreariness, from the fetters of one's own ever shifting desires. With this negative motive there goes a positive one. Man tries to make for himself, in the fashion that suits him best, a simplified and intelligible picture of the world. He then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience and thus to overcome it. This is what the painter, the poet, the speculative philosopher, and the natural scientist do each in his own fashion (cited in Singer, 1981, p. 40) .
Inspired by such positive and negative motives, reformers in North American teacher education currently t-'-e a confident, all-embracing attitude toward progress. In trying to overcome the world of school experience, they bank on new cosmologies derived from science and academic scholarship and reject commonsense notions of teaching, learning, and knowing.
What may be new in teacher education is quite old in philosophy, which has, in one of its veins, a long traditior of fondness for ambitious metaphysics. This traditiun is expressed in grand systems, from Parmenides to Plato, Leibniz, and Hegelthinkers confident of making progress in unravelling the mysteries of the world and not hesitant to posit ideas of a rather unearthly nature. There may be a moral in the history of philosophy for education. Philosophers have, by and large, abandoned grand schemes and self-assured beliefs in progress, having come to deveiup a iaore subtle and tentative stance toward the promises and drawbacks of both philosophy (as well as science, and theory in general) and common sense, whose petrified habits of mind are sometimes justified by sedimentary wisdom.
Flow can one get from the glazed surface of things, as they are, to the heights and depths of things as they might be in teaching? The answer does not lie in conversions or 15 2 0
simple shifts in what we worship as authoritative knowledge. Nor does it lie in inappropriate comparisons of teaching to other professions, with a misplaced envy of th,ir transformative socialization or of their greater imperviousness to common sense and ordinary experience.
One gets beyond the glazed surface by digging impartially, and carefully, into everything that comes to hand, including the "outside" knowledge by which we hope to improve schools. As Schwab (1978a) pointed out, passively submitting to the dicta of speciai knowledge is no more rational than disdaining thc specialist. Either posture is as fatal to learning as an unrealistic valuatk n of common sense or its unwarranted dismissal. Reform in education is less like a palace revolution than like a roundabout march to an elusive destinationwith faulty equipment, short supplies, and maps that will often turn out to be unreliable. 16 21
